Mikhail Aghajanyan - The process of the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement has recently shown some kind of stalling and absence of any significant dynamics of positive development. Such a tendency has been boldly outlined after the well-known meeting of three presidents in Sochi on January 25, 2010. It became even more prominent after the meeting of three presidents in Saint-Petersburg on June 17. 2010 and, at last, the meeting in the same format in Astrakhan finally convinced even the most fervent optimists of the fact that the stances of two conflicting parties did not reproach. Besides, according to estimations of some persons who are aware of the details of the discussions in triangular format, there is even no dynamics to rapprochement between the stances of the parties. After the meeting in Astrakhan, many expectations were connected with the meeting at the OSCE summit in Astana on December 1-2. Probably, the only novelty, which is to support the process of the settlement in the respectable shape and to prolong the international mediatory efforts, is the discussion of the issue of adoption of some “roadmap” within the process of the settlement. For the first time the later was actively discussed in 2009-2010 on both political and expert levels. Thus, at the end of 2009 and at the beginning on 2010 it had been often mentioned that Kazakhstan, the OSCE presiding country, is ready to offer Armenia and Azerbaijan a draft of conflict settlement document in the form of a “roadmap”. It was mentioned that “the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan Kanat Saudabayev announced the creation of a “roadmap” directed to the settlement of the Karabakh conflict. Prior to that he visited Azerbaijan and Armenia and made sure that there are positive shifts in the stances of the parties” 1. Back in October 2010, several days before the meeting of three presidents in Astrakhan, the US envoy to the OSCE Ian Kelly, mentioning the anxious situation on the cease-fire front line in the zone of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, stated that at current stage the most important was that the parties keep talking to each other in order to provide diplomatic process. As for the expectations of the American diplomacy from the upcoming OSCE Summit in Astana, Kelly mentioned about the possibility of a “roadmap” in the process of the Karabakh settlement in the context of inviting the parties to agree at least on a definite “roadmap” for the settlement of the conflict2. Drafting and implementation of a “roadmap” for the settlement of the old interstate conflicts is not an innovation3. One can remember an attempt to breathe a new life into the settlement of Israeli-Palestinian conflict just with the help of the adoption of a “roadmap”. The “roadmap” of Israeli-Palestinian conflict settlement4, which was approved on the highest international level, formulated in a form of a written document, to which the leaders of Israel and Palestinian administration set a seal, was not implemented and under the current realities of the Israeli-Palestinian settlement a few or none remembers about it. The “roadmap” of the Israeli-Palestinian settlement was formulated as a step-by-step process with definite stages when each subsequent stage logically ensues from the realization of the previous one. The “roadmap” of the settlement of any process of interstate conflict is a plan to obtain definite political goals and this means that it is first of all a plan of political settlement, which included, to varying degree, judicial and other aspects of settlement, but in its essence and general trend it still remains a political plan. Taking this into consideration, any “roadmap” should be ready for swing in its effectiveness; as anything political in modern world, here the effect is also most often twofold – either actual breakthrough (which by the way, has never been observed in international practice) or full stopping which can be seen in the most of the cases. There is no middle way if the “roadmap” is meant for the settlement of a complicated interstate conflict which takes place out of the immediate European space, because conflicting parties are not ready for the compromise in the sense as it is taken in the European political thought. Most often the parties approach the situation from the position of de-facto situation, i.e. “if I get something then it is mine, and I will not give it to anyone “for the hell of it”. The western meaning of compromise assumes that “for the hell of it” (i.e. to give for nothing or for something which is absolutely not commensurable with what you receive in return), and at the same time they make reference to a highly developed culture of compromise. Of course it is easy to achieve compromise in quite Europe as compared with the South Caucasus which is in fact divided by confrontations. The logical step-by-step constructions can hardly promote implementation of the “roadmap” of the Israeli-Palestinian settlement and the “roadmap” of the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement, because Israelis will never leave Eastern Jerusalem “just for the hell of it”, and Armenians will never renounce their legitimate claims for the compensation for the Genocide of the Armenians in Western Armenia. The “roadmap” of Israeli-Palestinian conflict has its logic. Thus, the first step stipulated the stage of “ending of terror and violence, normalization of the living conditions of the Palestinians, formation of the Palestine institutions”, which had to be carried out just within several weeks from the moment of the adoption of the “roadmap”. The second stage of the “roadmap” implied definite measures which “concentrate their efforts on the creation of an independent Palestinian state within provisional borders and with the attributes of sovereignty based on a new constitution and as an intermediate stage on its way to a constant settlement”. And finally, the third stage had to bring to “an agreement on the constant status and final settlement of Israeli-Palestinian conflict”. The main purpose of the Israeli-Palestinian “roadmap” was formulated as obtaining final and comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict till 2005. This purpose was sounded in the speech of the US president G. Bush on June 24, 2002 and approved by the European Union, Russia and UN in the statements made after the meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs on July 16 and September 17, 2002. More than 5 years has passed since “the time-frame of the final settlement”. According to some initiated experts “the fact of mismatch of the plan of the “roadmap” to the real situation was mentioned by the official Russian diplomacy. “By the end of this year we had had to begin creation of the Palestinian state. But in fact we are still just at the beginning of the first stage of the “roadmap”. The time-frame is unrealizable. Let’s not put a brave face on a sorry business, - said Alexander Kalugin, the special envoy of the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Middle East settlement, on August 18, 2005, – Ever since Israeli-Palestinian relations has only become strained and the time-frame of the “roadmap” has expired” 5. There was a kind of logic in two well-known Armenian-Turkish protocols where a definite sequence of stages within the specified time frame of their realization was set. There are following references to the time-frame of implementation of separate steps by the parties in two Armenian-Turkish protocols signed in Zurich on October 10, 2009, and this can be considered as stages of the “roadmap” of the normalization of the relations between two countries: - The establishment of diplomatic relations between two countries on the day when The Protocol on Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Armenia and Turkey comes into effect; - Opening of the borders within two months after The Protocol on Development of the Relations between Armenia and Turkey comes into effect; - Both Protocols come into effect on the same day, i.e. on the first day of the first month which follows the interchange of the ratification documents by the parties; - The last part of The Protocol on Development of the Relations between Armenia and Turkey includes the terms of formation and beginning of work of the intergovernmental commissions and sub-commissions. But everybody knows the difficulties the given logic faced; everybody knows that the world leading powers sounded the support of the process of the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement and concrete realization of the provisions of two protocols. The logic of the western political thought, based on an axiom of compromise with regard to the conflict settlement, was beaten by the logic of the direct participants of the conflict. With regard to the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement the logic of the only power which torpedoed the process, i.e. Turkey, consisted in the fact that in return for its “concession” in the form of opening of the border with Armenia, Ankara was ready to accept only “commensurate” concession – renouncing of the process of international recognition of the Armenian Genocide and withdrawal of the Armenian forces from the Lowland Karabakh. What fate is in store for the “roadmap” of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement if it is formulated in a written form? We can mention several positive, in our opinion, moments, in case of practical implementation of such an initiative, i.e. elaboration of the stage-by-stage lan of the Karabakh conflict settlement in the form of “roadmap”. But we should also mention aspects which may have negative effect on the process of the Karabakh conflict settlement. Let us only specify that one of the main goals of possible “roadmap” of the Karabakh conflict settlement, on which the external powers rely for achieving progress, may consist in the fact that the “roadmap” by itself may become a definite “compromise” between two traditionally dominating discrepant approaches – Armenian and Azerbaijani approaches to the conflict settlement, i.e., correspondingly, the “package” or “stage-by-stage” settlement. At first sight the “roadmap” is obviously “stage-by-stage” approach which gives preference to Baku. But it is not so. Each stage of this “roadmap” is a “package” of steps, the whole of set of definite actions. The combination of these two approaches is a well-known aspiration of the external powers which play mediatory role in the process of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement. Then why not to try to make this dream come true in the form of “stage-by-stage and package” approach in this “roadmap”? The positive effect of the “roadmap” may also manifest itself in the continuation of consultations and negotiations round the Karabakh settlement and this will preserve the current status quo in the region, will not allow this shaky stability turn into hostilities in the zone of conflict. The “roadmap” will become a kind of compromise between the main mediators represented by Russia, USA and France, as the trilateral format of meetings initiated by Russia makes many believe that the Minsk group is a kind of burden for Moscow and it wants to get rid of it. The “roadmap” will not allow the Minsk group fading from the scene but, at the same time, it will even more sideline the institution of the Minsk group. Because signing of any document between parties can become reality only by active diplomatic work of Moscow. For the later the way from the November 2008 Meindorf declaration to the October 2010 Joint Statement is a way of a certain “diplomatic regress” as in November 2008 something was signed, two years later only statement was made. In a situation like that Moscow needs to sign any document and it is desirable that it will be a significant document on the Karabakh conflict settlement. Then, the positive aspects of the “roadmap” are that it allows predicting further steps by two of the three conflicting parties, a kind of schedule of events, definite actions, which have to be implemented by a specific date. If this does not happen it would be easy to find out who does not stick to his liabilities stipulated in the “roadmap”. The “roadmap of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement” may also have a positive effect on stability in the region in general. From this point of view, if we compare it with the “roadmap” of Armenian-Turkish normalization, we can state that the only positive effect of the unfinished process of the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement is a greater degree of distinctness in the relations between Ankara and Yerevan, and such distinctness between regional rivals means greater degree of stability. It also implies that the external actors will follow the deviations to the negative sides and try to suppress those deviations because they are more interested in the stability in the region. So the “roadmap” puts the process within some frames, even if it is not brought to the logical end. Thus, since the adoption of the “roadmap” in 2003, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has not gone beyond definite borders of the disputed territories (e.g. to Syria, though there were some “encounters” on the Lebanese territory); Armenian-Turkish relations have not been deteriorated after the conclusion of the “Zurich protocols” but they obtained more distinct character. So one can hope that the availability of the “roadmap” in the Karabakh conflict settlement will become another element which will promote stability and will become a relative guarantee of not spreading a conflict beyond its current frame and areal. The negative factors are as follows: 1. If the “roadmap” of the Karabakh conflict settlement is drafted now, two well-known statements of the presidents of Russia, US and France will be extrapolated (June 10, 2009 and June 26, 2010) to it. Such a basis for the “roadmap” of the Karabakh conflict settlement, in our opinion, will be of negative character and will bring it to the dead end at the very first stage. The “roadmap” of the Karabakh conflict settlement cannot begin with the provision which reads “returning of the occupied territories round Nagorno-Karabakh”6. The first stage should be the conclusion by all the three conflicting parties of the agreement on the non-use of force at any stage of the Karabakh conflict settlement. The “roadmap” of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict settlement was mostly brought to the dead end by the fact that the external actors had overstated expectations connected with the withdrawal of the Israeli forces behind the so-called “green line”. Many experts mentioned that “many failures of the international diplomacy on the road to settle Israeli-Palestinian conflict are caused by the fact that the withdrawal of the Israeli forces behind the “green line”7 is considered as an immutable precondition necessary for the settlement. To set hopes on the withdrawal of the Israeli forces behind the borders which existed before 1967 as the main mean to achieve peace is as hopeless as to support the demagogic conversations of the US State Department about the correctness of the “roadmap” 8. There can be no retreat of the NKR to the borders of 1988, as there were no such borders, because today’s NKR was de-facto territorially formed within the borders of historical Artsakh, meanwhile some of its territories are still occupied by the Azerbaijani Republic. There can be no withdrawal of the Armenian forces from the territory of Lowland Karabakh until a real format of the process of negotiations between two parties, which are responsible for any hypothetical withdrawal of their forces from some territories, is formed. Those parties can be the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijani Republic and they have to become the main actors while implementing definite provisions of the possible “roadmap”, Thus, at current stage, there are no real grounds for the settlement and no real party composition of the “Karabakh roadmap”, 2. The “roadmap” is always an imperative demand for the parties to stick to their commitments mentioned in the concluded agreements. Definitely the only party which has been violating the requirements is Azerbaijan and this is proved by a sequence of armistices concluded during the war in 1991-1994, as well as a number of agreements with the participation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic following it (the classical example is the Agreement about the Enforcement of the Cease-Fire Regime which was officially signed under the auspices of the OSCE on February 4, 1995 by all the three conflicting parties). There can be no efficient or any positive return from any “roadmap” if the party, which initially considers itself “injured party”, reserves the right to reconsider its commitments. In this connection the full name of the Israeli-Palestinian “roadmap” dated May 2003 is demonstrative: “Roadmap” to a permanent settlement of Palestinian-Israeli conflict in accordance with the principle of coexistence of two states based on the evaluation of the implementation of the obligations by the parties. We believe that the assessment of the “implementation of the provisions of the roadmap” by Azerbaijan will always be unsatisfactory because there is no style of respectable attitude towards the opponents necessary for the constructive dialogue in Baku. “Karabakh roadmap” is unrealizable against the background of the chauvinism towards everything Armenian and claims on “Western Azerbaijan”. 3. For the positive implementation of the “roadmap” there is no such an accepted in the international practice institution as the personal envoy whose intermediary services are accepted by all the parties to the conflict. The institution of co-chairmen of the Minsk group cannot be considered as the similar to the institution of the personal envoy of the head of the state. People are necessary who would work on the elaboration, coordination and implementation of the “roadmap” 24-hours a day, and, what is most important, they would have a mandate for such a work from the heads of states which are the external mediators. After the events round South Ossetia in August 2008 an issue of creation of the position of the special envoy of the US president on Karabakh settlement was discussed behind the scene by Western experts. Later on, they spoke that it would be more reasonable if there was a special envoy of the US State Secretary in the process of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement. It is remarkable that today such conversations in the Russian expert circles have become more often. Thus, Russian experts, mentioning absence of any real progress in the process of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement after the meetings of the presidents of Armenia, Russia and Azerbaijan, said after the meeting in Astrakhan that “the promises of Medvedev that by the moment of holding the OSCE Summit in Kazakhstan on December 1-2 Yerevan and Baku would get a new coordinated variant of general principles of the settlement of the conflict inspires no optimism. Even more, in case of elaboration of such principles they would not go beyond the norms formulated by Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in the joint declaration signed in Moscow on November 2, 2008. Thu, they will again speak about obscure commitments which do not promote real initiation of the peace talks”. Russian experts believe that the main reason for it is that Kremlin has not “enough diplomatic tools to solve this issue”. All the contacts with the conflicting parties are mainly built through the president. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides technical support to the head of the state. At the same time Russia has no such position as the special envoy of the Russian president on Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Traditionally in the international practice, the special representative gets to the heart of the matter and reconciles differences between conflicting parties. He is also responsible for the everyday work and contacts with the counteragents. This is the only way not only to achieve a true understanding of the matter but also to gradually pave the way for the process of negotiations. Russia has nothing like that. Nominally, the role of the special envoy is taken by the representative of Moscow in the Minsk group. But this is mostly ceremonial post which has no full powers, just like the OSCE by itself” 9. 4. And finally, probably the most important restraint for the positive implementation of the “roadmap” of Karabakh conflict settlement is the absence of the intentions of main external powers to settle anything in the Nagorno-Karabakh process. The fact that the process of settlement is necessary does not cause any contradictions. But this does not mean that the external powers tend to obtain any result. There is already a result and that result has caused relatively efficient sustention of the status-quo in the zone of the conflict for the recent 16 years. Enough is as good as a feast and the external powers realize that current situation is better than the uncertainty which follows the first step in the hastily drafted “roadmap” of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement. Noravank

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