by David Petrosian The skirmishes in the northeastern and eastern sections of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border in TavushMarz (Province) and at the line of contact of the sides in Nagorno Karabakh (in the southern section) have aggravated the situation in the conflict zone. According to official sources and press reports, the recent skirmishes have left five Armenian servicemen and ten Azerbaijani ones dead. The skirmishes lasted three days and started after two Azerbaijani subversive groups filtered into the country near the Armenian border villages of Voskepar and Chinari, which are within about 60 kilometers of one another. The subversive sortie was timed to coincide with the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's visit to Armenia as part of her regional trip. These actions of Baku caused an outburst of emotions in the Armenian press, the essence of which boils down to the following claims: - it appears that Mrs. Clinton has brought death and a new phase of destabilization into the region; - Moscow urged Baku to commit aggression against Armenia in order to discredit the U.S. Secretary of State and to show that it is the "master of the situation" in the region. Both versions do not stand up to criticism as they simply do not correspond to the reality for the reason that the position of Baku itself is not taken into account. Yet, its position is more than obvious because the purpose of President IlhamAliyev's administration is to demonstrate to all the external players without exception that: - Baku is not happy with the current status quo and the course of the negotiating process; - the OSCE Minsk Group cannot ensure the maintenance of the ceasefire regime and achieve the settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict; - it is necessary to transfer the conflict settlement and the whole negotiating process to another international organization where decision is taken not through a consensus as is done in the OSCE, but by a simple majority vote. The aggravation of the situation contributes to the strengthening of the Ilham Aliyev regime as it justifies the suppression of democratic and civil freedoms in the country in the face of external danger. One should do justice not only to the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, but also to the presidents of the co-chairing countries - they promptly reacted to what had happened and also issued quite tough statements, however, without… naming the guilty. No doubt, all the problems related to strengthening the ceasefire regime are obvious. As before, the co-chairs take no steps for the implementation of the Agreement on the Strengthening of the Ceasefire Regime, which was signed in early February 1995 by the defense ministers of the three conflicting parties (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the Nagorno Karabakh Republic) on the orders of the presidents. In view of the recent incidents, it is hard to disagree with the viewpoint of Vladimir Kazimirov, who in 1992-1996 headed the Russian mediatory mission and was the Russian president's plenipotentiary representative on Nagorno Karabakh and the Co-Chair and participant of the OSCE Minsk Group. It should be reminded that V. Kazimirov was the diplomat who formalized the ceasefire signed by the conflicting parties in Moscow in May 1994. In his latest article "Incidents as Political Line of Baku" published in Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Russia), Vladimir Kazimirov expressed an idea that the leniency of the mediators towards Baku's disruption of the fulfillment of its obligations is totally inappropriate. It is necessary to openly record this disruption, otherwise all attempts aimed at settling the conflict, including the reconciliation of the main principles for the future peace accord, will be futile because, in V. Kazimirov’s opinion, a fundamental question arises: Will the accord be implemented? As regards the incident investigation mechanism, which is so frequently mentioned by the co-chairs, V. Kazimirov believes that it cannot be perfect as long as there are no neutral observers. "Yet, there is already more than enough information to reveal their political reasons," V. Kazimirov wrote. In general, what is happening along the contact line of Armenian and Azerbaijani sub-units is only part of the developments taking place in the South Caucasian region. In particular, we should note that in addition to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict with Yerevan and Stepanakert, a serious tendency to the deterioration of Azerbaijan's relations with its neighbors is obvious: - the relations of Baku and Tehran have never been particularly good, but after President Ilham Aliyev was declared the leader of the Azerbaijan is throughout the world, the relations have notably deteriorated, to which border incidents (both land and naval ones) between the two countries have contributed. The recent purchase of a large consignment of Israeli weapons by Azerbaijan gave renewed impetus to the deterioration of relations. The total cost of the deal is $1.6 billion. The specification of the purchased weapons indicates that most of them can be used against Iran (including in naval operations), rather than against Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia; - the problems with Russia are increasing. These problems include not only issues related to the lease of the Gabalin radar station, for which Baku for some reason wants to charge 40 times the previous amount (!). From the military and technical point of view, the Gabalin radar station is currently not as important to Russia as it used to be in the 1990s and the 2000s. Moscow attaches more importance to maintaining its military presence in Azerbaijan, whereas Baku - to all appearances - has decided to put an end to it. Meanwhile, the Ilham Aliyev administration ought to have become alerted by the activity of Lezgin and Avar organizations in Russia as they actually began to make demands for better conditions of their compatriots in Azerbaijan; - the relations with Turkmenistan have become strained in connection with Ashgabat's intention to start seismic work at the trans-border oil and gas field Kyapyaz (the Turkmen name of the field is "Serdar"). The revival of an old bilateral conflict is evident. The absence of agreements between the countries of the Caspian Sea on its status forms the basis of the mentioned conflict. For the time being, it is not clear how the conflict will proceed, but the fact that it exists is more than obvious. Georgia remains the only neighbor of Azerbaijan, with which Baku has relations that can be described as allied. The saber-rattling in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict zone may result in new problems not only with Stepanakert and Yerevan, but in other directions as well. For this reason, perhaps, Baku had better be more reserved.

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