The passed parliamentary elections in Iran which fortified political stability in the country after the 2009 elections, created fertile ground for Tehran to stir up regional policy. This article covered such issues as Iranian-Turkish, Iranian-Russian and Iranian-Azerbaijani relations. Iran-Turkey: Iraqi factor Since 2002 when pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party came to power in Turkey the relations between Tehran and Ankara have shifted to a new development stage. Most of the political contradictions between the states have been smoothed over, Turkey and Iran managed to develop “Kurdish policy” which would take into consideration the interests of both states, Ankara made a step in a direction of normalization of the relationship with Syria and Iranian-Turkish economic relations recorded an unprecedented growth. If in 2000 the general volume of goods turnover between Iran and Turkey was $1 billion, in 2011 it reached $16 billion. But the “Arab spring” and Turkish policy in the Arab countries in 2011 returned the old problems to the Iranian-Turkish relations. It became obvious that Turkey and Iran have two cardinally different ideas of the region they both are targeted on. And this first of all regards three states: Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. If support of the anti-Shiite powers in Lebanon and anti-governmental powers in Syria by Ankara is directed to the provision of the political changes which are advantageous to Turkey and the Iranian factor has indirectly become a condition which counterworks Turkey, the situation in Iraq is different. Ankara’s actions against the central authorities of Iraq constitute a direct menace to Iran i.e. the weakening and overthrowing of pro-Iranian government in Iraq may cause destabilization in Iran and close geopolitical and political route to Syria and Lebanon going through Iraq. The Iraqi factor has become one of the main reasons that set Tehran and Ankara against each other. The aggravation of the Iraqi-Turkish relations over the recent months has been connected with several main domestic and external developments. In the Syrian crisis Iraq took the side of the Syrian authorities and did its best to deteriorate the formation of the Arab anti-Syrian front. No other approach of the Iraqi authorities can be expected as overthrowing of the Assad government and victory of the Islamist powers in Syria will directly bring to the strengthening of anti-Shiite powers in the region, in the direct proximity of Iraq and will break the balance in the country which is based on the alliance between the Shiite and Kurdish communities. Both of them constitute direct menace to Turkey as in case with Shiite they openly take pro-Iranian stance in all the processes in the region and in case with the Kurds it may cause stirring up of the Kurdish factor in Turkey and bring to the destabilization of the situation in the east of the country. Over the recent months Ankara’s policy in Iraq was directed to the criticism of the central authorities of Iraq and was abundant with calls to create a government of real solidarity which should include more representatives of Sunnite and Turkman communities of the country. It should be mentioned that the Turkish criticism of the Iraqi government is supported by the president of the Kurdish autonomy Masoud Barzani who made statement back in March that the structure of the coalition government should be changed. Most probably, Barzani wanted to get a bigger share for the Kurdish powers in the central authorities of Iraq and showing a united front with Turkey was simply a means to an end. Barzani who met the prime-minister of Turkey R.T. Erdogan even hardened the criticism of Iraqi prime-minister Nuri al-Maliki. The Kurdish self-confidence in Iraq can be conditioned by several factors and first among them, in our opinion, is the developments in Syria in which local Kurds are directly involved. Barzani acknowledges that destabilization in Syria in a result of which in the neighborhood of Iraq Kurdish and Sunnite armed groups are formed constitute serious menace to the Shiite community in Iraq and its representative prime-minster al-Maliki. Barzani indirectly offers a “deal” to Baghdad: more places for Kurds in your government on your part and prevention of transferring Kurdish destabilization from Syria to Iraq on our part. Recently it has been said in Iraq that al-Maliki and Shiite powers, supported by Iran, refused such a deal. On April 2 – on the next day after Erdogan-Barzai meeting – the prime-minster of Iraq al-Maliki at his meeting with the journalists, harshly criticized Barzani but in the first place he criticized Turkey. Maliki mentioned that Ankara is an “enemy state” which interfered into Iraq’s domestic affairs “and if it continues the same way, Turkey will become enemy number one for the whole region”. On the next day after that the prime-minister of Turkey Erdogan characterized Maliki’s statement as “dirty threat” and on April 23 al-Maliki arrived in Tehran to have talks with the president of Iran. However, the aforementioned chronology is already conspicuous. Let us mention that agreements were acquired during al-Maliki’s visit to Tehran which would drastically reduce the dependence of the Iraqi economy on Turkey; Iran promised to increase the investments into Iraq’s economy and boost goods turnover. Today Turkey is Iraq’s first trade partner - $11 billion turnover annually. The turnover between Iran and Iraq in 2010 was $8.1 and in 2011 - $9.7 billion and it is planned to reach $12 billion this year. It is obvious for Iran the reduction of the economic dependence of Iraq on Turkey is a necessity and the Iranian authorities work actively in this direction. Iran-Azerbaijan In recent months the Iranian-Azerbaijani relationship has aggravated. Azerbaijan bought armament from Israel at a cost of $1.6 billion which was taken by Tehran as step directed against Iran. The Israeli-Azerbaijani relations have always caused discontent of Iran, but today when possible Israeli strikes at the Iranian nuclear and military objects are acquiring real outlines Tehran started considering Baku as a real threat which can provide its territory to Israel for carrying out military actions. Baku also is discontented with Iran, taking into consideration the circumstance that Tehran is eagerly furthering Islamization of Azerbaijan which indirectly threatens the ruling secular Aliyev family regime. This causes discontent of the religious segment of the society not only due to its secular character but also due to its autocratic mechanisms which contradict to Islamic ethics and religious and political culture. Over the recent decade the destruction of the secular opposition by the authorities caused a situation when the only opposition left in the country is the Islamic one which is rather difficult to control: the religious life and activity are proceeding underground apart from the political institutions. The network character of the Islamization of Azerbaijan in fact partially takes it out of the state control. In this case Iran’s support of the Islamic renaissance in Azerbaijan constitutes direct menace to Baku. This month the Iranian-Azerbaijani relations have even aggravated. Taking advantage of “Eurovision” song contest held in Baku, different Iranian media issued material devoted to the pro-Western orientation of Baku, presenting this song contest as anti-Islamic and anti-traditional event. A number of media characterized the contest as a sexual minorities’ parade. And in May pro-Islamic and pro-Iranian powers in Azerbaijan joined anti-governmental rallies and in consequence some activists were arrested. As a result, Baku connected the aggravation of the political situation in the country with Tehran and after that anti-Iranian protest action under the slogan “Against the anti-Azerbaijani policy of Iran” took place in front of the Iranian embassy in Baku on May 11. The protest action was the most anti-Iranian one in the history of Azerbaijan, as not only classical appeals, such as a call to stop cooperation with Armenia, but also the insults to the Iranian state (Iranian flag was burnt) and its leader Ali Khamenei were voiced. In consequence, on May 20 Tehran ambassador to Baku was withdrawn back to Tehran. According to press-release spread by the Iranian embassy in Baku, the ambassador Mohamed Bahrami was recalled to Tehran to conduct a consultation connected with insulting the Muslim saints. Though this is rather serious aggravation of relations, Baku, nevertheless, does not stop disseminating anti-Iranian statements, so that it seems that Baku does not want to mend the differences. Thus on May 22 the press-secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan stated that: “Iran cannot normally take appearing of thousands of tourists in our country, including Iranian tourists who see the success of Azerbaijan. Our independent policy bothers some people, but we are going to continue it”. And the member of Azerbaijani Majlis G. Hasanguliyev took it a further step and stated that: “homosexuality is an integral part of Iran’s culture”. Judging by the recent impressions, Baku does nothing to smooth over differences with Tehran and even more it tries to escalate the situation. This is, maybe, an expression of the geopolitical choice of Azerbaijan, by which Baku hints to Tehran that in case of possible Iranian-Israeli (American) collision no friendly attitude can be expected on behalf of Baku. Iran-Russia Iranian media reacted to the election of Vladimir Putin as a president of the Russian Federation rather heartily. During the presidency of Dmitri Medvedev the Russian-Iranian relations were in crisis which was connected with Medvedev’s policy directed to the development and deepening of the relations with the US. The perception of Vladimir Putin in Iran and Iranian press differs from the one of Medvedev. If the latter was referred either neutrally or with mild criticism, Putin mainly deserves positive evaluations. Today Iran and Russia face a necessity of setting their relations and in this direction definite steps will be taken in the months to come. And the fact that the relations will be set is obvious, taking into consideration that Tehran and Moscow face the same challenges in the region. The most important among them is the provision of the stability in Syria and exclusion of the western military interference. Form this point of view Russia and Iran are all in the same boat while West, Arab world and Turkey are in the other. Today the normalization of the Iranian-Russian relations is accompanied by another process – both Tehran and Moscow actively reconsider their “Turkish policies”. In May Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs made two harsh statements concerning Turkish policy. The first regarded the decision of Turkey to initiate gas drilling in Cyprus water area which should be accompanied by maneuvers in the same district. The second one regarded International Conference on Caucasus Studies held in Istanbul, at which the declaration calling to “continue sacred war against Russia” for the liberation of Caucasus was accepted in the presence of the representatives of the Turkish government. In a consequence, the Iranian-Russian relations will be reconsidered in order to deepen them even more. On March 2 V. Putin stated that he would do everything to “Prevent military actions directed against Iran”. On March 4 the president of Iran M. Akhmadinejad called to V. Putin and congratulated him with this victory at the elections. According to official press-releases of two states the parties also discussed regional issues, mentioning inadmissibility of military interference of the third states into the domestic affairs of the Arab states. However, it will be clear in the months to come in what direction the Russian-Iranian relationship will deepen, but setting of those relations does not generate any doubts. Sevak Sarukhanyan Deputy Director of “Noravank” Foundation, head of the Center for the Political Studies, Candidate of Science (Political Studies) “Globus” analytical journal, # 6, 2012

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