THE CHALLENGES OF SMALL STATES OF THE SOUTH CAUCASUS IN THE POST-COLD-WAR PERIOD


THE CHALLENGES OF SMALL STATES OF THE SOUTH CAUCASUS IN THE POST-COLD-WAR PERIOD

  • 12-01-2016 12:56:09   |   |  Articles and Analyses
Arman Navasardian 
Chairman, Department of World Politics and International Relations, Russian-Armenian (Slavonic) University, and Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
 
For millennia the Caucasus was a place where active trade and cultural ties were developed, diplomatic agreements were reached and military alliances were forged and dissolved. The Caucasus used to be a crucial part of the Great Silk Road, through which Europe was connected to Central and Western Asia. The trade route passing through South Caucasus, including Armenia was known since the times of Homer and Golden Fleece [1, p. 290]. Hence, since ages ago peoples and states not only fell out and warred with each other, but also were rational enough to cooperate in politics, trade and culture, thus paving the way for cooperation and integration for the coming generations.
 
However, the Transcaucasian nations’ imperative to participate in the world politics and establishment of a new world order encounters some unsurmountable obstacles, because the region is tangled in political, economic, ideological, cultural and ethnic discords and conflicts, where “problematic socioeconomic, ethno-territorial, religious, geopolitical and other interests intertwine”[2, с. 8].
 
After the collapse of the USSR the post-Cold War tectonic shifts engulfed also the South Caucasus, which stopped being just a sphere of Russian influence. New players appeared in the region: the US, EU, Turkey, Iran, and China. Also South Caucasus started to be viewed as a part of the Greater Middle East, with all that it entails. Consequently, big political games and combinations unfold, which threaten to turn the region into an epicenter of clash between those struggling for Caucasus, first of all the Atlantic and Eurasian interests. The balance of power between these two blocs is subject to change. By the end of the last century Russian positions significantly weakened here, while the US boosted its Caucasian policy vector. However, decisive and tough actions by V. Putin gradually change the realities. Russia “returns” to Caucasus. “The peaceful end of the Cold War, culminating in the fragmentation of the Soviet Union, signaled the final step in the rapid ascendance of the United States as the first truly global superpower. That internationally dominant power, together with its politically motivated and economically dynamic partner, the European Union, appeared capable not only of reviving the West’s global preeminence, but also of defining for itself a constructive global role. Twenty years later, few expect the European Union to emerge soon as a politically serious global player while America’s preeminent global status seems tenuous.” [3, с. 14] This is how pessimistic is the political future of European Union and the Unites States seen by Zbigniew Brzezinski, one of the most prominent political analysts of the time, who has been a staunch supporter of Western values and interests all his life. However, the weakening positions of the USA by no means suggest decreased interest in South Caucasus, which is “located on the crossroads of “political storms” from East and West, North and South. The newly established states of the region slowly turn from objects into subjects of international law. The Caucasus will remain for long in the focus of important interests of the classic hegemon states of the region: Russia, Turkey and Iran” [4, с. 13].
 
In the context of global changes in international relations, the three South Caucasus republics do not have uniform stances. Armenia is the strategic partner of Russia and member of EAEU, and develops parallel bilateral relations with Iran, USA and EU. After the Turkish-Azerbaijani political honeymoon, Baku attempts to find balance between Ankara and Moscow, keeping also in mind oil interests of the UK and USA. Georgia positions itself as a supporter of American values, generally conducting anti-Russian policies.
 
In the last twenty years the ongoing geopolitical and geostrategic transformations in the Caucasus has been fundamentally changing the political image of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan as new subjects of international law, and the relevant foreign policy practices. Two critical circumstances prevent them from becoming full-fledged members of the international community and participating in the process of new world order formation. These are: (a) East-West struggle; and (b) ethnic and interstate conflicts. Generally, the Caucasus along with the Balkans are considered sources of threat to the international security. In the Caucasus as a whole, “there are over 50 smoldering ethno-political conflicts, many of which are international… ethnic differences can be used by certain political forces (including international ones) and political leaders, when purely political nature is attributed to them” [5, с. 222]. In addition to overt conflicts between Georgians, Abkhazians, Ossetians, Armenians and Azeri, there are covert animosities between ethic majorities of the South Caucasus states and minority Armenians of Javakhk (Georgia), Talyshis and Lezgians (Azerbaijan). The no war, no peace situation in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, absence of diplomatic relations and unresolved issues between Armenia and Turkey, as well as geopolitical ambitions of Ankara maintain a cold war status and push them away from the framework of world politics.
 
One of the effects produces by the collapse of the Soviet Union was emergence of polities in the Caucasus that declared sovereignty and were even able to uphold it during the conflicts. However, they were not recognized internationally, but just by a few members of the UN. These are Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Transnistria Moldavian Republic. Also, in 1990s there were several failed attempts to gain and institutionalize independence through military actions. The most vivid example of this was Chechen Republic of Ichkeria [6]. Some other authors believe Russia disregarded these developments as something like an unfinished reality. “They did not become fully independent… the Russians called neighboring states “near-abroad” and treated them as prodigal sons, rather than independent nations” [7, с. 363].
 
Implementation of the program of Centre for European Policy Studies, in our opinion, may help ease the political tensions in the region, contribute to the process of establishing normal relations between the states and joining the family of civilized nations. Below are some of its components:
 
1. Solving the issue of the right to self-determination (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno Karabakh) based on peculiarities of each case and expression of free will by populations of each ethno-territorial polity. Congresses representing each polity are to be established that will have an authority to adopt laws and would protect political, cultural, and religious rights of the polity.
 
2. Bilateral and multilateral regional cooperation, particularly in the frameworks of the EU and CIS. The three independent nations of the South Caucasus (plus Nakhichevan territory) should be able to participate in this cooperation as separate entities. However, it is too early to conceive of establishing such relations in the form of regional structures. South Caucasus, as a strategic area, cannot remain isolated from global processes, and hence, the states of the region, as well as regional organizations are under the imperative to establish balanced cooperation. The cooperation has to be at the levels of both political institutions and civic non-government organizations.
 
3. The historical experience tells that ethnic problems hinder regional cooperation. This is a serious challenge that peoples of South Caucasus need to overcome, if they strive to build alternative societies, because societies based on these values are more capable of regulating ethnic discord between the peoples.
 
4. Finally, the system of regional security should be able to respond to the needs of the South Caucasus peoples, with consideration of the historical experience of conflicts and geopolitical counteractions between the larger powers. The geopolitical competition between Russia and the Western superpowers, Russia and Turkey, and the Armenian-Turkish conflict are the striking realities of this historical experience. The main elements of the South Caucasus security system must be capable of countering such clashes and ensuring the peoples’ security. Yet the complexity of the existing problems prevents creation of a common security system. Each state in South Caucasus takes care of its own security and in the foreseeable future it is hard to change this situation. Nonetheless, the only means to protect the population of the region from devastating clashes is to maintain the common neutrality of the states [8].
 
September, 2015
References and Literature
1. Seymour T.D., The Life in the Homeric Age. N.Y. 2000.
 
2. К.С. Гаджиев, Геополитика Кавказа, изд. Международные отношения, М., 2003.
 
3. Збигнев Бжезинский, Стратегический взгляд. Америка и глобальный кризис, изд. АСТ, М., 2013.
 
4. Геополитика Каспийского региона, М., изд. «Международные отношения», 2003.
 
5. Внешняя политика: вопросы теории и практики, изд. Университет, М., 2009.
 
6. Сергей Маркедонов, Аналитические доклады Института Кавказа, N 5, январь 2012.
 
7. Джеймс Ф. Данниген, Остин Бэй, Горячие точки XXI века, из. ЭМСКО, М., 2014.
 
8. Անդրանիկ Պետրոսյան, Հարավային Կովկասն ու Եվրոպական քաղաքական հետազոտությունների կենտրոնական ծրագիրը, Քննական վերլուծություն, Երևան, 2013:
 
 
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